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Comment
Comment: First Amendment Rights of Prisoners
to Have Access to the News Media in Relation to
Administrative Policy Bans Upon Such Access
No doubt prison administrators sense that to permit the media
and the public access to their domain would result in stripping
away a major justification for their existence: that they are con-
fining depraved, brutal creatures. As The New Yorker's Talk of
the Town column put it, during the Attica uprising, millions of
Americans were brought face to face with convicted criminals for
the first time. Most of us were wholly unprepared for what we
saw . . . the crowd we saw on television was not a mob but a
purposeful gathering, and the men we saw were not brutalized,
although they may have suffered brutality-they were unmistak-
ably whole men. We saw men acting with dignity, not men
stripped of their pride.'
That the press and electronic media have long been destroyers
of myth is no revelation. Yet the willingness, or unwillingness
in the case of America's penal system, of society to observe such
destruction hinges upon how sincere we are in our desire to get
at the truth. To give lip service to first amendment rights of the
press and prisoners to have access to one another for purposes of
getting at some degree of truth, while simultaneously upholding
the arbitrary rights of prison administrators to deny access under
the umbrella of security, is to deny ourselves the realization that
our penal system is failing.
1. J. MiTFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT at 13 (1st ed. 1973).
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The aim of this comment is to provide an overview in light of
recent court cases dealing with the right of the press to have ac-
cess to prisoners, particularly those incarcerated in maximum se-
curity institutions. These new cases, arising out of both state and
federal jurisdictions, reflect the vacillating state of the law of pris-
oners' rights in general, while also attempting to come to grips with
the particular issue of first amendment rights of prisoners to have
access to the press. Also, there is a conflict between administrative
standards designed to maximize administrative efficiency, and the
constitutional right to allow free access which carries with it the
inherent risk of destruction of that efficiency.
Examining the rights of prisoners within any context, particu-
larly as they relate to first amendment rights, must be done from
multiple sides. This article will look first to the problem as the
courts view it and what the sudden change in judicial attitude has
brought. Secondly, it will view the administrative attitude regard-
ing issues as they relate to those people who are in charge of the
penal system on a day-to-day basis and whose concerns revolve
around more pragmatic issues than those of a constitutional nature,
namely security.
The article will also attempt to examine the problem from the
press' viewpoint, with an eye towards the cause and effect issues
which access to prisons might have. Throughout the article, the
problem will be viewed as the prisoners see it, concentrating sub-
stantially on the question of why access is so desperately wanted
by prisoners as a means of circumventing the administrative pro-
cedure for airing their grievances.
RELUCTANT JUDICIAL INTERVENTION AND THE NEED FOR IT
Court Attitude
Traditionally, the courts have displayed a ready willingness to
disregard what occurs behind the closed doors of prisons, concen-
trating more readily upon the rights of citizens before they become
incarcerated. Yet with the increase in j ailhouse lawyers and prison
uprisings, the courts have been forced to abandon their "hands off"
approach realizing that judicial intervention is needed to either
clarify or reform administrative policies. What has, however,
emerged out of this reluctant intervention has been a series of con-
flicting judicial edicts on the subject of prisoners' rights after in-
carceration.
Two of the earliest cases reflecting the conflict were Price v.
Johnston2 and Coffin v. Reichard.3 The theory behind Price was
that "Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal
... of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system."4  In actuality, this
theory is dicta from the court rather than a pronouncement of
law. Yet, this has not stopped later courts from using this theory
as a springboard for further cases.
In the case of United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station
WENR,5 the court stated that "We think that it is well settled
that it is not the function of the courts to superintend the treat-
ment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but 'only to de-
liver from imprisonment those who are illegally confined." There
again, the overriding concern for due process for the innocent who
may have been mistakenly incarcerated rather than for the guilty
who attempt to assert an otherwise fundamental right, is present.
The Coffin case, however, presented an alternate theory, one
whereby "[a] prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen
except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him
by law."'7 It was a theory which placed the burden upon the ad-
ministrative officials to show adequate cause for denial of a funda-
mental right.
While recognizing 'all the legitimate arguments of Price and Mor-
ris, arguments which revolve around the belief that guilt carries
with it some constitutional denial as a penalty, the federal court
added further confusion by its holding in Brown v. Peyton.8 In
Brown the court stated that:
(while) the judgments of prison officials are entitled to consid-
erable weight because they are based upon first-hand observance
of the events of prison life and upon a certain expertise in the
functioning of a penal institution, prison officials are not judges.
They are not charged by law and constitutional mandate with the
responsibility for interpreting and applying constitutional provi-
sions, and they are not always disinterested persons in the resolu-
tion of prison problems. We do not denigrate their views but we
cannot be absolutely bound by them.9
2. 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
3. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
4. 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
5. 209 F.2d 105 (1953).
6. Id., at 107.
7. 143 F.2d 443, 445 (1944).
8. 437 F.2d 1228 (1971).
9. Id., at 1232.
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The courts, then, have been faced with this dilemma: whether
to grant complete discretion to correction officials and risk a possi-
ble abrogation of constitutional rights of prisoners; or whether to
recognize that while prisons may punish by incarceration, all fun-
damental rights should not be denied to prisoners. Just what de-
nials lawful incarceration carries with it as a penalty is a basic
question which must be approached through a realistic appraisal
of three elements: jailhouse security; prisoners' rights; and, the
public right to know.
The policy of the courts until recently has been dubbed one of
"federal abstention or a hands off doctrine"'10 with occasional en-
trances into the area when there were "exceptional circum-
stances."" Yet, hand written pleas discovered to be requests for
adjudication of gemlike legal questions in the manner of Gideon,
questions which have grown more imperative in light of prison
uprisings, have prompted judicial response. The courts could not
bear to resist cases and controversies which revolved around ad-
ministrative indiscretions and arbitrary disciplinary rulings.
No longer could prisons and their inmates beconsidered a closed
society with every internal disciplinary judgment to be blissfully
regarded as immune from the limelight that all public agencies
ordinarily are subject to.12
Court Access
Fundamental to any issue of prisoner-press access is, of course,
the rights of prisoners to have access to the courts themselves,
for once this right was acknowledged, the possibility of additional
access could be rested upon an analogous legal foundation. Once
the courts were willing to open the door to pleas of those behind
prison walls, judicial intervention in the administrative correc-
tional area became an integral part of post conviction litigation.
Appeals from death row were considered alongside of appeals for
injunctive relief from administrative discipline. "Reasonable ac-
cess to the courts is basic to all other rights . ,for it is essential
to their enforcement."'13
10. Hollen, Emerging Prisoner's Rights, 33 OMO ST. L.J. 1, 8 (1972).
11. Id., at 8.
12. Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 132 (1970).
13. Stilner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1963).
The judiciary has traditionally been reluctant to act as a reme-
dial arbiter, preferring instead to remind legislatures of their duty
to enact sufficient safeguards to prevent arbitrary standards. Yet,
prison uprisings combined with the preferred position of the first
amendment has forced some degree of intervention. Despite the
obvious need for adjudication, however reluctant, there are still
many problems related to court access by prisoners which need
to be resolved before a concise declaration regarding fundamental
rights of prisoners can be achieved.
One problem has been that judicial intervention is never re-
garded kindly by administrators.
Even where the courts do intercede, the effects of judicial inter-
vention may not always be salutary. Prison officials may view
judicial involvement as a serious threat to their authority. More-
over, a decision adverse to the prison administration may create
a new assortment of disciplinary problems by undermining inmate
respect for prison officials. Inmates, having the court's sympathy,
may think that the ultimate arbiter of the disciplinary process is
the court and not the prison officials. Consequently, inmate disci-
pline as well as staff morale may decline substantially.14
There is also a problem of inconsistency as it relates to access
between the state and federal courts and those prisoners confined
to state or federal facilities. While it is true that "a prisoner of
a state does not lose all his civil rights during and because of his
incarceration and that in particular, he is protected by the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses which follow him through
the prison doors,"15 his right of access to state courts is more lim-
ited than those of his counterparts in a federal prison. Therefore,
his first -amendment rights are not as readily enforceable in state
prisons since access to court is, of course, fundamental to enforcing
those rights.
The inconsistency in relief is apparent when the treatment of
a prisoner's petition for relief is examined in relation to the dif-
ferences in manner of handling between state and federal courts.
For example, a prisoner in a California state facility must base
his first amendment challenges, procedurally, either by way of Sec-
tion 1983 of the U.S. Civil Rights Act or by habeas corpus. Even
assuming a procedural survival of his petition to the federal courts,
there is still no guarantee that his claim will be adjudicated since
14. Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, Judicial Intervention in Prison
Discipline, 63 J. C~iM. L.C. & P.S. 203 (1972).
15. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 576 (8th Cir. 1968).
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"the principal obstacle confronting a prisoner is that whether he
proceeds by way of habeas corpus or under the Civil Rights Act,
he must allege and prove that his mistreatment at the hands of
prison officials has violated one or more of his federal constitu-
tional rights; anything short of that will not support federal juris-
diction no matter how malicious or harmful the mistreatment may
have been."' 6
Prisoners in federal penitentiaries, of course, have fewer proce-
dural obstacles to overcome. This accounts for why the majority
of cases relating to prisoners' constitutional rights have their origin
in federal institutions. This often results in a discrepancy between
the way in which state and federal correctional agencies admini-
ster to their prisoners. Added to "the threshold obstacle concern-
ing the existence of a constitutional question . . . are the consid-
erations of delay, distance, unfamiliarity, and natural judicial re-
luctance, all of which militate against the usefulness of a federal
forum in a prisoners' -conditions case."'1 7 This is especially true
when the petition evolves out of a state facility.
Yet, despite the obvious deficiencies involved in traditional meth-
ods of prisoners' petition for relief, a recent court decision which
has opened a new route for prisoners to assert first amendment
rights via the fourteenth amendment guarantees of due process and
equal protection. This case recognizes the right of prisoners to
try and establish rights not yet in violation but rather in a dec-
laratory form.
Goodwin v. Oswald,8 involved an attempt by inmates of Green
Haven, a maximum security facility in Stormville, New York to
contact attorneys to aid in establishing a prisoners' union. The
case itself revolved around the issue of the attorney-client relation-
ship and the protection of confidentiality of mailings involving that
relationship. The court, of course, dealt with the traditional first
amendment questions and the whole concept of which preferred
rights are retained by prisoners. Yet, the court did not wholly
rely upon a first amendment analysis, seeing that as too narrow
and too abstract a concept to base a general question of access
to attorneys and courts upon.
16. B. E. Bergesen III, California Prisoners: Rights Without Remedies,
25 STAN. L.R. 1, 8 (1972).
17. Id., at 9.
18. 462 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1972).
Rather, the court turned to the fourteenth amendment and a
due process analysis, thereby providing a wider range of judicial
intervention.
Prior to Goodwin, fourteenth amendment rights were not available
to an inmate who did not have a grievance about the legality or
conditions of his incarceration, one which constituted a cause of
action and a claim for relief based on a right that was already
established and secure. In Goodwin, the court asserted that it
was sufficient that the attorneys were trying to establish certain
rights.1 9
The new analysis supplied by the Goodwin court, if accepted by
all federal courts, will surely increase the volume of litigation that
arises from prisons. It runs the danger, in the view of some, of
taking much needed authority from administrators by allowing
prisoners to attempt to have the courts pronounce standards of
discipline -and the like rather than leaving that power in the hands
of correctional agencies.
Yet, the court has traditionally stopped short of becoming a mon-
olithic legislature, and it is obvious by virtue of the enormous in-
crease in prison revolts that something is wrong in the way in
which prisons are being run. Requests for access to courts, attor-
neys and the press from prisoners beyond the appellate stage has
usually been grounded in a deep seated need for relief of some
kind. The warden's office is not the proper forum to adjudicate
these constitutional questions; the proper forum lies in the court-
room.
Access to courts and attorneys has therefore been established to
a large degree. It remained for the courts to produce a broad rul-
ing regarding the press, thereby formulating a triumvirate of ac-
cess which might ultimately allow for the free flow of expression
within the prison system. In this manner, the possibility of arriv-
ing at the root causes of penal system failure would increase.
However, in the most recent of court cases, the United States
Supreme Court chose to be anything but liberal in its view of
the press, or the need for prisoners to have increased access to
the press. Despite the opportunity to provide complete access, the
court decided to uphold the constitutionality of certain state and
federal bans on specific inmate interviews, using prison security
as the catchall rationale. 20
19. 58 IOWA L.R. 1323, 1336 (1973).
20. The United States Supreme Court recently decided that a California
prison regulation which limits access to specific prison inmates for the pur-
pose of interviews was constitutional. Earlier, a three-judge panel for the
ninth circuit had ruled that the ban was unconstitutional and arbitrary.
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THE ADMINISTRATV VIEw: PREss ACCESS EQUALS
A SEcuRrrY THREAT
To understand the reasons behind the administrative reluctance
to provide press access to prisoners, one must look to the concep-
tual problems involved in man seeking to imprison not only a crim-
inal's physical being but his emotional and intellectual being as
well. Mental incarceration is obviously harder to obtain and any
force which might disrupt containment, is a threat to those in
whom such responsibility is entrusted. It is not so much from
the pressures of physical confinement that prison uprisings ensue,
but rather from the pressures of mental atrophy which the penal
environment produces. Witness prisoner demands, for increased li-
brary and vocational facilities rather than for total physical re-
lease as evidence of this situation.
Recognizing that it is the delicate balance of mental tranquility
which could be disturbed by press access, the prison administrators
have used the guise of prison security as the means to limit jour-
nalistic forays into penitentiaries. Citing political and racial dis-
sension as by-products of any well publicized interview when cir-
culated behind prison walls, prison officials have greatly limited
the extent to which a reporter may investigate a story related to
a criminal once incarcerated or a story related to conditions in a
prison itself.
The lower court contended that prisoners had a right to request personal
interviews, however, that journalists themselves did not warrant such an
absolute right. The state appealed the court ruling on the issue of pris-
oners' rights, while representatives of the California journalistic commu-
nity appealed the matter of reporter limitations. The regulation involved
was Calif. Dept. of Corr. Manual § 415.071 (1973), dealt with by the lower
court in Hillery v. Procunier, U.S.D.C. N. Cal. 8/16/73, 13 CR. L. 2550.
On June 24, 1974, the United States Supreme Court overturned the lower
courts decision in Hillery. The high court split the case into two separate
issues. In a 5-4 ruling, the court found that the constitution made no pro-
vision for journalists to have access to information not readily available
to the public. The vote was 6-3 against the prisoners' having a right to
complete access, with the court going so far as to say that other means
of communication such as letters to families was adequate. Institutional
security was cited as the primary reason for upholding the limitations.
The high court also overturned a lower court decision in Washington
Post v. Kleindeinst, Civil No. 72-1362 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 6, 1972), 1 PRISON
L. RPTm. 337 (1972), thereby reinstating as constitutional a federal ban on
interviews with specific inmates. For a brief explanation of these cases
see 87 Los Angeles Daily Journal 126 at 1.
This security argument was attempted by prison officials even
against attorney access in Goodwin v. Oswald2 1 and the effects of
uncensored correspondence between attorney and prison client.
The state argued that the correspondence would undermine disci-
pline by promoting an alternative authority structure within the
prison, provoke hostilities between pro-union prisoners with the
possibility of violent reaction when they were informed that the
union could never exist. The danger that injudicious communica-
tions from attorneys might have an inflammatory effect on rela-
tions between groups of inmates or between inmates and correc-
tions officers was perhaps the most persuasive argument support-
ing the state's position that prison security requires a reading-
and perhaps censoring-attorney's letters to clients. Such a dan-
ger might be especially pronounced when there have been recent
disturbances at the prison related to the matter upon which the
attorney is advising inmates.22
When the right which a prison petitioner has attempted to assert
has been in relation to the first amendment, prison administrators
usually have advanced certain standard arguments for preventing
such access which upon analysis seem to have little merit.
They are:
(1) To assure compliance with prison rules.
(2) The administrative costs ....
(3) Prisoners will enter into illegal outside activities or con-
spiracies.
(4) To prevent escape plans from being made.
(5) To protect sensibilities of persons outside and to prevent criti-
cism of the institution.
(6) To keep out pornography which causes perverse sexual be-
havior.
(7) To prevent the introduction of contraband and weapons into
the prison.
(8) To screen out inflammatory writing that could incite the pris-
oners.
23
Critics of these arguments generally point to the one which re-
lates to protecting sensibilities of people and preventing criticism
of the institution as the one which is fundamental to the entire
problem. It relates to the whole concept of locking prison doors
to forget about that which we either abhor or can do little about.
Criticism of the institution might foster criticism of the agency
which administers it, and a let sleeping dogs lie attitude is pre-
ferred. Officials point to the lack of constructive alternatives
available and, as such, criticism if circulated in prisons only adds
to an already abnormal environment.
21. 462 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1972).
22. 86 HARv. L. REV. 1607, 1617 (1973).
23. Hollen, Ermerging Prisoner's Rights, 33 Omo ST. L.J. 40 (1972).
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Too few incidents of prison revolt have been found which have
any direct correlation to a reporter's detailing of prison conditions
to substantiate arguments regarding security. No sustainable, or
at least reported, evidence appears to exist to show that a reporter
has smuggled contraband weapons or pornography into a prison,
nor that one has aided or abetted an escape. All that has been
offered has been mere speculation based upon sensational incidents
such as that of inmate George Jackson of Soledad prison in Cali-
fornia.
Jackson was a controversial prisoner, labeled by his advocates
as a militant black who had been incarcerated more for his political
views than for any other reason. Officials, however, saw him as
a disruptive force, particularly after the press began to demon-
strate an interest in him and requested personal interviews.
Until the late 1960's, such interviews were relatively infrequent
and resulted in little burden upon or danger to the institutions.
With the manifested discontent within the prisons and the conse-
quent arousal of public concern and curiosity, however, the num-
ber of requests for media interviews increased substantially. The
Department (of California Corrections) accommodated this influx
despite the accompanying increased demands on its personnel and
facilities...
It was against this background that the tragic events of August
21, 1971 took place. During an escape attempt at San Quentin,
three staff members and two inmates (one of whom was Jackson)
were killed. This was viewed by the officials as the climax of
mounting disciplinary problems caused, in part, by its liberal pos-
ture with regard to press interviews. 24
As a result, the Department of Corrections of California insti-
tuted a policy ban on interviews, Section 415.071.25 In arguing for
the validity of the interview ban, the officials persisted in their at-
titude that violence within the prisons had a direct correlation to
the increase in interviews. They especially attempted to show this
correlation as it related to George Jackson.
Mr. Guthrie (a representative of the California Department of Cor-
rections) described the prisoner as a "big wheel" and stated he
believed the August 21 violence arose, in part, out of the there-
tofore liberal interview policy. However, when questioned fur-
ther, he admitted that the prisoner has, in fact, only a limited rep-
24. Hillery v. Procunier, U.S.D.C. N. Cal. 8/16/73, 13 CR. L. 2550, 2551
(1973).
25. Id., at 2550.
utation outside prison and had not achieved "celebrity" status
within it prior to August 21. Such status was attained only after
his death.* * *
But when asked to explain the nature of the connection between
interviews and the violence, neither Mr. Guthrie in his testimony,
nor defense counsel in his argument, nor Mr. Procunier (head
of the California Department of Corrections) in his affadavit, could
specify facts showing a direct relationship between the two.20
The increase in prison revolts appears to be putting pressure
upon administrators to attempt to try and contain what could be
a potentially uncontrollable situation. Yet what might be at the
root of the pressure, the seeming desire to prevent access in the
name of security, is the inability of the internal prison hierarchy
to comprehend the sudden rise in revolts along with the sudden
failure of traditional methods of confinement and discipline.
No longer is an indeterminate sentence in solitary confinement
a useful method of forcing submission when a prisoner need only
emerge from solitary and petition the court for relief. The thought
then, of a prisoner granting 'an articulate interview to the press
on such internal procedures causes the officials to utilize more of-
ten the traditional procedures of incarceration.
Yet, the sudden problem lies not so much in the attitude of the
officials which appears to be a constant, but in the change in the
type of prisoner which is capable of attracting press attention. This
was evident at Attica State Prison where revolt by inmates caused
both death as well as public attention. An excerpt from the offi-
cial report on the uprising reflects this sociological change in pris-
oner characteristics, as well as the lack of change in internal prison
correctional staff.
But the new Attica was increasingly populated by a new kind of
inmate. Attica, like most of our prisons, had become largely a
black and Spanish-speaking ghetto, and the new inmate was
shaped by the same experiences, expectations, and frustrations that
culminated in eruptions in Watts, Detroit, Newark and other
American cities. The young inmate was conscious of the changes
in attitudes in the black and Puerto Rican communities, on the
campuses, in the churches, and in the anitwar movement that had
touched him. Names like Malcolm X, George Jackson, Eldridge
Cleaver, Angela Davis had special meaning to him.
The new inmate came to Attica bitter and angry as the result of
the experiences in the ghetto streets and in the morass of the crim-
inal justice system. Very likely, he already did, or would soon
see himself as a "political prisoner"-a victim, not a criminal. For
all its changes, Attica was still a prison, the very symbol of au-
thoritarianism, and in the summer of 1971, it was caught up in
an era of decline and rejection of authority.
26. Id., at 2551.
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Attica's all-white correctional staff from rural western New York
State was comfortable with inmates who "knew their place," but
unprepared and untrained to deal with the new inmate, much less
to understand him. Unused to seeing their authority challenged,
officers felt threatened by the new inmate. Viewing the recent
relaxation of rules and discipline, the intervention of the courts,
and the new programs for inmates, they felt that their authority
was being undermined by Albany and that their superiors were
not backing them up. The officers became increasingly resentful
and insecure. The result was, inevitable, daily confrontations be-
tween the new inmate and the old style officer.2 7
Many prison officials contend that much of the recent tension
lies in the influx of prisoners who were aligned with politically
or racially oriented causes prior to incarceration. Press attention
and sympathy is often aroused and prison administrators see this
as merely serving to produce internal conflict.
The political prisoner phenomenon does, of course, attract the
press, but to assert that the press' interest in a potentially impor-
tant story does more than call attention to the public to the story,
or to provide a source by which prisoners might vent their intel-
lectual or emotional tension, appears to be unsupported. Yet, of-
ficials persist in assertions that outside influences, including rep-
resentatives of the press, are indeed responsible for the dissension.
Thus, in 1913, Ralph E. Smith, president of the Wisconsin Associa-
tion of Governing Boards, told his colleagues in the American Pri-
son Association, "In spite of the fact that great advancement has
been made in methods of reform, it is also undoubtedly true that
in no corresponding length of time have there been more serious
outbreaks and revolts in prison." The cause, he believed, was "the
agitation of so-called social workers. Their misrepresentations of
the conditions of prisons and prison life have led prisoners living
under admirable prison conditions to believe that they are treated
worse than the worst, and that their condition is nothing more
nor less than that of abject slavery. They are today not only caus-
ing unrest within prisons but, are contributing a great deal to the
development of lawlessness without."
More than half a century later, at the 1969 American Correctional
Association Congress, Warden R.W. Meier of McNeil Island Fed-
eral Penitentiary expanded on the same point: "We can without
question blame some of our problems on outside influences. I
think you know what I mean ... there is the problem of well-
organized disturbances brought on by the resisters, draft dodgers,
professional agitators, Communists, hippies and revolutionaries
27. ATTICA, THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COM-
MISSION ON ATTICA (New York: Bantam Books, Inc.; 1972) at 106, 107.
. . . .Former prisoners, militants, far-out liberals, subversives, and
even a few clergymen, educators, and social workers, on the out-
side seem to delight in fomenting unrest in prisons."
Again, in 1971, in response to a question by Congressman Charles
B. Rangel about the causes of the peaceful demonstration of con-
victs at Railford, Florida, in which scores were injured by guard's
gunfire, Director of Corrections Louie Wainright said he thought
Jack Anderson "contributed to the disturbance" by his columns
about conditions in that prison. Which caused Congressman
Rangel to declare, "The last warden we had testify said it was
a Communist conspiracy. Now we have another warden saying
that Jack Anderson has created a major part of the problem. How
can you have faith in a system like that?" 28
Only in one notable case, Yarish v. Nelson29 which involved mili-
tant activist Ruchell Magee, does the apparent threat to security
by allowing press access appear to have been justified.80
Magee was a survivor of an escape attempt in which a Marin
County judge was killed. Appellant -requested an interview with
Magee prior to his trial. The interview was scheduled to occur
August 23, 1971, two days before the death of George Jackson and
the outbreak of violence at San Quentin prison. Respondents,
along with the Attorney General, denied the interview, setting up
Section 415.071, which banned individual prisoner interviews under
potentially explosive circumstances, as a defense.
The court sustained the respondents' position of the possible ad-
verse effects of pre-trial publicity, citing Sheppard v. Maxwell8 '
as ample precedent for such precautions. Nevertheless, the under-
current running through the court's analysis was the potential
threat to security that Magee posed, given his past alleged con-
duct. Here was a man that might provoke harm to either himself
or those given free access to him. Given the circumstances of
Marin County, coupled with the San Quentin incident, extraordi-
nary precaution appears to have been justified rather than reac-
tionary or overprotective.
28. J. MITFORD, KiND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT, at 230, 231 (1st ed.
1973).
29. 104 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1972).
30. It was the same rationale of threats to institutional security and
efficiency which led to the overturning of a lower court ruling in Hillery
v. Procunier, U.S.D.C. N. Cal. 8/16/73, 13 CR. L. 2550 (1973), a case which
tested the constitutionality of the ban which was used in Yarish. The
United States Supreme Court in its most recent ruling on the matter of
access found the ban to be proper and in no way an abridgement of
prisoners' rights to communicate with the outside world. 87 Los Angeles
Daily Journal 126 at 1.
31. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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THE PRESS' VIEW OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW EQUALING
A RIGHT TO INVESTIGATE
The early cases which deal with access and the media were ones
which originated from within the prison, generally involving a dis-
pute over an administrative refusal to allow a particular publica-
tion from being circulated to inmates. One of the landmark cases
in this area was Fortune Society v. McGinnis32 which concerned
prisoner access to a publication devoted to detailing prison condi-
tions, written predominantly by former inmates.
In upholding a prisoner's right to receive such *a publication
under the first amendment, the court stated that, "[o]nly a com-
pelling state interest centering about prison security, or a clear
and present danger of a breach of prison discipline, or some sub-
stantial interference with orderly institutional administration can
justify curtailment of a prisoner's constitutional rights. '3
This case came as the culmination of a long fight by prisoners
to have free access to virtually any publication they chose. It also
served as a -reiteration of the long standing need for a clear show-
ing of a state interest which was of a substantial nature. Use of
a "clear 'and present danger" standard was not unexpected since
it denoted the heavy burden a party has when seeking to abrogate
a first amendment right.
Mere antipathy caused by statements derogatory of and offensive
to the white race is not sufficient to justify the suppression of re-
ligious literature even in a prison. Nor does the mere speculation
that such statements may ignite racial or religious riots in a penal
institution warrant their prescription to justify the prohibition of
religious literature, the prison officials must prove that the liter-
ature creates a clear and present danger of a breach of prison se-
curity or discipline or some other substantial interference with the
orderly functioning of the institution.3 4
In the past few years, demands for access have increasingly
arisen from outside the prison from reporters attempting to obtain
interviews. Many suits involve prisoners, in conjunction with re-
porters, in an -attempt to further the rights of free expression. In
order .to understand the press' position, it is necessary to remember
that the press has generally asserted that a basic right to know
32. 319 F. Supp. 901 (1970).
33. Id., at 904.
34. Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 822 (3rd Cir. 1968).
hinges upon a basic right to investigate. While cases do exist
which uphold the public right to know via press freedom, no clear-
cut judicial edict on the right to free, unimpeded investigation ap-
pears to exist. While cases such as Branzburg v. Hayes85 which
put limitations upon free investigatory practices do appear, this
does not mean that access has been impossible to achieve.
In Nolan v. Fitzpatrick,36 the court granted the first amendment
rights to prisoners to send letters to the news media, though the
prison officials were not barred from reading and reviewing the
letters before they were mailed. The court held that prison offi-
cials could only properly refuse to mail letters where evidence of
contraband or escape could be plausibly demonstrated. It should
be noted that the prisoner-plaintiff involved in the suit never con-
tested the right of prison officials to have the authority to read
the outgoing mail.
Plaintiff sued for the right to send letters referring to internal
matters of the prison, in particular letters regarding reaction to
an article on the state prison in which they were incarcerated. It
was in essence a letter of appreciation for what they believed was
a fair treatment of the problem of prisoner grievances. While re-
fusing to provide for total first amendment freedoms while incar-
cerated, the court interestingly enough went to the right of the
public to hear such complaints.
In so concluding, we rely primarily on the fact that the condition
of our prisons is an important matter of public policy as to which
prisoners are, with their wardens, peculiarly interested and pecu-
liarly knowledgeable. The argument that the prisoner has the
right to communicate his grievances to the press and through the
press, to the public is thus buttressed by the invisibility of prisons
to the press and public: the prisoner's right to speak is enhanced
by the right of the public to hear.37
The state offered the arguments relating to security, namely
what effect inflammatory letters emanating from prison and later
circulated in published form would have upon security. The court,
however, in what appears to be both faith in the ability of prison
officials to contend with such situations, along with a desire to
protect the constitutional freedom which is related to mailing of
letters, said that "In extreme cases, prison officials can cope with
the situation by refusing to admit the dangerous issue of the news-
paper to the prison rather than by refusing to mail the letter in
the first instance. '38
35. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
36. 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971).
37. Id., at 547, 548.
38. Id., at 549.
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On the heels of Nolan, came a case which, while dealing with
the right of mailing personal correspondence in relation to the Due
Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment, did discuss the issue
of the first amendment as a "fundamental" right. The analysis
set forth in the case by Justice Doyle offers insight into the prob-
lem of applying human dignity to the fundamental rights issue.
I anticipate that in the prisoners cases, considerable difficulty will
attend the selection of individual interests to be characterized as
"fundamental," so as to invoke the requirement that the state show
a compelling governmental interest in the regulatory classification.
With respect to the general population, such a selection has been
made over the years. However, the most striking aspect of prison,
in terms of fourteenth amendment litigation, is that prison is a
complex of physical arrangements and of measures, all wholly
governmental, all wholly performed by agents of government,
which determine the total existence of certain human beings (ex-
cept perhaps in the realm of the spirit, and inevitably there as
well) from sundown to sundown, sleeping, waking, speaking, si-
lent, working, playing, viewing, eating, working, reading, alone,
with others. It is not so, with members of the general adult popu-
lation. State governments have not undertaken to require mem-
bers of the general adult population to rise at a certain hour, retire
at a certain hour, eat at a certain hour, live for periods with no
companionship whatever, wear certain clothing, or submit to oral
and anal searches after visiting hours, nor have state governments
undertaken to prohibit members of the general adult population
from speaking to one another, wearing beards, embracing their
spouses, or corresponding with their lovers. There has been no
occasion to test the constitutionality of such measures as applied
to members of the general population. New ground must be
broken, therefore, in deciding which, if any, of the individual in-
terests affected by such requirements and prohibitions are to be
characterized as fundamental.39
The court has recognized the extraordinary circumstances of
prison disturbances where the compelling state interest has been
substantial and as such has refused access. As previously noted,
access was refused in the case Yarish v. Nelson.40 The court up-
held the ban on specific interviews 41 with prisoners due to the state
interest in containing inflammatory pre-trial publicity.
Yet, the court is often faced with the problem that blanket bans
present, even where there is a compelling state interest, as regards
39. Morales v. Schmidt, U.S.D.C. E. Wis., 4/6/72, 11 CR. L. 2061, 2062
(1972).
40. 104 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1972).
41. Calif. Dept. of Corr. Manual § 415.071 (1973).
situations which are fluctuating in nature. While the Yarish rul-
ing relates to a specific ban as it was applied to a specific inmate
in what was obviously an extremely tense circumstance, it also
involved legal issues of pre-trial evidence. Blanket bans on a
prison population in toto are apparently subject to changing fac-
tors.
Following the uprising at Attica State Prison in New York,
prison officials imposed a blanket ban upon press interviews with
inmates who were incarcerated at Attica during that time. In the
first of its rulings in this particular case, the United States District
Court for Western New York, ruled in Burnham v. Oswald (1)42
that individual reporters and Playboy magazine as a party litigant
representing the press' position, could receive no federal relief from
the ban against inmate interviews.
The court seemed convinced that the occurences at Attica had
not been sufficiently quelled so as to allow reporters access as
might be afforded under reasonably normal circumstances. The
circulation of potentially inflammatory news articles might have
reignited disturbances within the prison.
However, the court in Burnham v. Oswald (II), 4 3 reevaluated
its position, and upon further evidence, ruled that the New York
State guidelines promulgating a blanket ban was, in fact, unrea-
sonable and needed to be revised in order to prevent usurpation
of inmates' constitutional rights.
Accepting the rationale presented in Nolan v. Fitzpatrick44 re-
garding the retention of first amendment rights after incarcera-
tion, the court also noted that the state's interest in security was
defeated. In -this instance, it was overshadowed by the public right
to know which was dependent upon the press' right to investigate
news sources.
Burnham (II) did not offer unlimited access for newsmen nor
did it restrict administrators to the point where policies regarding
inmate interviews were meaningless. But, it offered an example
of where the delicacy of the internal situation, which might pos-
sibly be upset by interviews, was outweighed by the need for pub-
lic exposure to the prison crisis. The possibility of security prob-
lems was insufficiently shown. A clear and convincing showing
was needed and the state failed in its evidentiary burden. The
state revised its ruling to provide broader access. 45
42. 333 F. Supp. 1128 (1971).
43. 342 F. Supp. 880 (1972).
44. 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971).
45. 12 CR. L. 2275, 2276 (1972).
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The partial dependence upon Washington Post by the court in
Burnham (II) belies the crux of the press' argument. Granting
the public a right to know is insufficient without a right for the
public's agents, the press, to have an equally recognizable right
to investigate. In Washington Post reporters argued for the right
to in-depth interviews, interviews where they might be able to
reach beneath the superficiality that is probable in restricted inter-
views where officials are always present or where fears of admini-
strative reprisal is an undertone.
The right to investigate as a bona fide partner to the public right
to know while admitted in Washington Post was not a uniformly
recognized right and was subject to review. The case was reheard
in District Court on the issue of how the ruling related to Branz-
burg v. Hayes.46 The lower court reaffirmed the unconstitutionality
of the blanket ban on interviews with inmates in federal institu-
tions which the Washington Post reporters were contesting.47
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia circuit has traditionally
ruled in a liberal manner regarding first amendment rights. Ema-
nating from that court were the first rulings which spoke of a
"paramount" public right to know 48 and of the rights of citizens'
groups to intervene in Federal Communications Commission licens-
ing rulings for reasons of public necessity. The Washington Post
ruling was ultimately reheard before the United States Supreme
Court. It was not reviewed primarily on the issue of a blanket
right to investigate as being naturally derivative from the right
to a free press. Instead, the high court looked to the constitution-
46. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
47. For the original ruling see Civil No. 467-72 (D.D.C., Apr. 5, 1972),
1 PRisoN L. RPTR. 141 (1972). The case was then stayed after the Branz-
burg decision, in 406 U.S. 912 (1972). The lower court then reconsidered
the case in Washington Post v. Kleindeinst, Civil No. 72-1362 (D.C. Cir.,
Sept. 6, 1972), 1 PRIsoN L. RPT. 337 (1972), reaffirming the original de-
cision. The Federal Bureau of Prisons decided to appeal the second ruling
to the United States Supreme Court, contending that the ban was ex-
pressed in Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dept. of Justice Penal Statement
1220.1A, Inmate Correspondence with Representatives of the Press and
News Media (February 11, 1972), was a reasonable limitation. In a ruling
consolidating this with other cases on access, the high court found the fed-
eral ban to be constitutional and non-violative of the first amendment. See
87 Los Angeles Daily Journal 126 at 1.
48. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
ality of the federal ban as it related to prison security. Finding
the ban to be proper, the court noted that "the problems of deter-
rence, rehabilitation and maintenance of order in prisons outweigh
any infringement of free speech. '49
Along with the Washington Post case, the high court also re-
viewed a California ban on access, found by a lower court to be
unconstitutional in Hillery v. Procunier.50 The United States Dis-
trict Court for Northern California had ruled that a Department
of Corrections ban on specific prisoner interviews violated the first
amendment rights of prisoners, though not necessarily those of
journalists. The court found no legitimate evidence that inter-
views produced either a security problem or a "celebrity" situation
such as the one which officials felt had occurred with George Jack-
eon.
Instead, the court characterized such arguments as vague specu-
lations which were in need of a greater showing of a jeopardized
compelling interest. The lower court ordered a revisal of the pol-
icy to allow for broader access and to bring it in line with the
first amendment. The Supreme Court, however, found that the
regulation was a proper means of keeping order in state facilities
just as it was in federal ones.
Prisoner rights were maintained, the court contended, by virtue
of their being able to correspond with journalists by mail or via
visitors such as wives and ministers. According to Justice Potter
Stewart writing for the majority, journalistic rights were similarly
maintained by press tours which were regularly given and which
did allow random interviews."
Two additional cases which relate to blanket bans are Seattle-
Tacoma Newspaper Guild, Local 82 v. Parker,52 and Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Kleindeinst.53 In Seattle-Tacoma, the
United States Court of Appeals for the ninth district found that
a federal ban 54 on individual inmate interviews did not violate the
first amendment rights of either the prisoners at McNeil Island
Federal Penitentiary of Washington, or of the news media.
49. Time, July 8, 1974, at 58.
50. U.S.D.C. N. Cal. 8/16/73, 13 CR. L. 2550 (1973), decided by the Su-
preme Court on June 24, 1974 in a consolidated ruling with the Washington
Post case. See 87 Los Angeles Daily Journal 126 at 1.
51. 87 Los Angeles Daily Journal 126 at 15.
52. Civil No. 72-2330 (U.S.D.C., 9th Cir. June 7, 1973), 13 CR. L. 2315
(1973).
53. U.S.D.C., Texas, 8/24/73, 13 CR. L. 2549 (1973).
54. Federal Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 1220.1A (1972), see
supra note 48 for how this federal ban was treated by the Supreme Court.
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McNeil is a maximum security prison which has been the scene
of disturbances and a prisoner strike in 1971, during which the
usual emergency precautions were taken. The news media wished
to have access to the prison officials, employees, administrative di-
rectives on treatment and inmates and particularly strike leaders.
The directive from the Federal Bureau of Prisons provided for gen-
eral access but denied individual interviews on the grounds that
individual interviews caused disciplinary problems to increase and
created prison celebrities or "big wheels" which damaged the re-
habilitation process.
The court, while recognizing the public interest involved in being
informed of the prison situation, fell back on a rational basis test:
whether or not the federal and state officials had a rational basis
from which to refuse individual access. However, the court de-
clined to impose a blanket constitutionality, limiting its ruling in-
stead to McNeil Island and the situation at that prison. The court
accepted the ban as being within the parameters of the prison sys-
tem and found that it did not impede confidential relationships
which a prisoner had a right to.
Houston Chronicle is probably of little precedential value to the
issue since it relates to how the Federal Bureau of Prisons policy
ban applied to contract jails. Contract jails hold potential inmates
of federal prisons while awaiting trial and sentencing. In that case
the court stated that the ban was inapplicable in relation to local
jails and was in and of itself too broad. "The Chronicle's right
to seek out news is a part of its first amendment right to publish
news." 55
CONCLUSION
What the cases in this area reflect is a desire on the part of
the press to pursue a right to investigate in an atmosphere where
concealment cloaked in the guise of security has been common.
Similarly, they evidence a desire on the part of prisoners to air
grievances beyond the prison walls. Yet despite supposed judicial
concern for the maintenance of a free press as well as for certain
rights which should naturally be carried even into prison, the com-
pelling state and federal interest to preserve security seems to have
55. U.S.D.C. Texas, 8/24/73, 13 CR. L. 2549 (1973).
taken precedence. It is not surprising that the current United
States Supreme Court has ruled in the manner described earlier.
One need only look at the way in which the court has begun to
widen the powers of law enforcement in the search and seizure
area to recognize that the concerns for a more ordered society have
prompted a highly conservative judicial approach.
No ruling or discussion of them would be just or complete with-
out the realization that individual interviews with prisoners may
at some time or place carry with it a risk. Some discretionary
rules are needed. It is, of course, conceivable that an individual
prisoner might attempt to utilize publicity he -receives to his own
advantage within the confines of the prison, just as it is conceivable
that a prisoner might offer a critical view of conditions which is
lacking in substance or validity.
Nevertheless, any lifting of bans upon individual freedoms car-
ries with it the inherent risk of abuse and indiscretion. Perpetuat-
ing a system of confinement involves certain built-in resentments
which must be recognized. There is resentment on the part of the
prisoner who must adjust to the narrow walls within which his
existence has been limited as a result of his crime. But there is
also resentment on the part of officials whose job it is to maintain
at least a semblence of peace in a 'tense situation.
The advantage of access which has few limitations attached is,
of course, a clearer, more open picture of how our penal system
operates. A closed society, such as has existed behind prison walls
until the past few years, is an enigma in what is basically a society
endowed with more press freedom than any other. One only need
look at what the by-products of diligent investigatory reporting
have given us, what expos6s on society's ills have eventually pro-
duced, to realize that the probable result would be some reforma-
tion of the system.
To counteract the security arguments presented by administra-
tive officials, who see access as a triggering mechanism to an al-
ready overblown, explosive circumstance, one need only look at
the reverse side of the argument. Does not access to the press
-and the public via a press conduit provide an additional safety
valve? It is a valve which can be tapped to alleviate some of the
tension prisoners feel within when the administrative procedures
are too slow or impersonal in responding.
Press abuses are possible along with prisoner abuses, the desire
for a sensational story being a factor of the profession, but there
are sufficient numbers in the news media who regard their job
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as one of a trustee for the public's right to know what is occurring
within its institutions. Access would hold greater advantages
than disadvantages for a penal system which needs public under-
standing as an impetus to implementing change.
SHARON HASS
